WEEK 1--INTRODUCTION TO THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE;
MOVEMENT-IMAGE AS PERCEPTION

Abridged Version -- Read chapters 1-5, skipping part of Chapter 3 (pp. 40-55), the end of Chapter 4 (pp. 66-70), and part of Chapter 5 (pp. 76-80).

Watch the following films:

• *Broken Blossoms* (d. Griffith, 1919).
• *Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans* (d. Murnau, 1927).
• *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (d. Dreyer, 1928).
• *Metropolis* (d. Lang, 1927).
• *Man with a Movie Camera* (d. Vertov, 1929).

1 Bergson and movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>movement</th>
<th>space covered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indivisible</td>
<td>divisible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“heterogenous, irreducible” (1)</td>
<td>“single, identical, homogenous space” (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>concrete/qualitative duration</td>
<td>subdivided/quantitative time</td>
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<tr>
<td>[durée]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>privileged instants -- “keyframes” or special tableaus</td>
<td>any-instant-whatevers -- impartial quantizing</td>
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Hence Bergson's conclusion that cinema is **false movement**

• the cinematographic illusion
• *immobile sections + abstract time*
  i.e. reconstitute movement by adding a “mechanical, homogenous, universal” time axis (ex 24 fps) to a series of photographic still frames.
• this is “false” because it's an *illusion* of movement.

Yet Deleuze wants to show that the cinema can also be a **real movement**

“Can we conclude that the result is artificial because the means are artificial?” (2)

• phenomenological? experiential?
• real movement -&gt; concrete duration
  “In short, cinema...” (2)

2 privileged instants and any-instant-whatevers [*instant quelconque*]
• ancient: “formal transcendental elements (poses),” privileged instants, dance, an “intelligible synthesis” (4)
• modern: “immanent material elements (sections),” any-instant-whatevers, cinema, a “sensible analysis” (4)

definition of cinema (5)

(yet the privileged instant can also return in the cinema, hence any-instant-whatevers can also do double duty as privileged instants [6])

3 change
• ** instants A and B are to movement, as movements A and B are to duration **
• thus cinema itself is a Whole [le Tout] (8) and movement implies the change in the Whole
• the whole is “the Open” [l'Ouvert]; it “endures” (9)
• difference between a whole and a set [ensemble] (10)
• hence three levels (11)
  1. sets of discernible parts (frames)
     ◦ i.e. any-instant-whatevers
  2. the real movement of translation between frames
     ◦ i.e. movement-images
  3. the duration or the whole, a “spiritual reality”
     ◦ i.e. time-images (11), also called here “duration-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are beyond movement itself”

Chapter 2 Frame and shot, framing and cutting [cadre et plan, cadrage et découpage]

framing
• corresponds to Bergson's first level: sets of discernible parts (frames)
• five points (12-18; summary on 18):
  • (1) framing is determination of a set (and hence tends toward either rarefaction or saturation);
  • (2) in that determination it is also an absolute geometric delimiter of space, i.e. a rectangle or an iris;
  • (3) but also a relative geometric force, internal to the frame, i.e. composition and pattern, zones w/in the image, a deterritorialization of the elements of the set (15);
  • (4) an angle of framing or point-of-view;
  • (5) out-of-field/offscreen space [hors-champ] as both diegetic space and “a more radical Elsewhere [Ailleurs]” (17).
the shot (18)
• corresponds to Bergon's second level: the real movement of translation between frames (hence the movement-image in its purest sense)
• bounded and determined by cutting
• determines the movement of the closed system (of the framing of the shot)
  □ such movement always happens in two ways at once:
    1. the micro movement of all the elements inside the shot.
    2. the macro movement of the whole (irreducible to the micro elements).
• he calls the shot an intermediary between framing and montage -- it gets pulled in both directions (19-20)
• thus “the shot is the movement-image” (22, emphasis added)

montage -- i.e. cinema only becomes cinema when you move the camera, either via a mobile camera (continuous movement) or via montage (discontinuous movement) (24-25)

Chapter 3 Montage
• corresponds to Bergon's third level: the composition of movement images into a duration or whole (hence a gesture toward the time-image)
  □ “Montage is the operation which bears on the movement-images to release the whole from them, that is, the image of time” (29) □
• he says this is “indirect,” the composition of “an indirect image of time” (30)

1 the organic American school (Griffith)
• montage is like an organism that has many parts that are different but work together (shot, reverse-shot, insert, etc.) (30)
• “parallel alternate montage” (30) -- i.e. a rhythmic alternation between parallel events.

2 the dialectic Soviet school (Eisenstein)
• i.e. not organic interplay of different elements (shot, reverse-shot, insert), but more profound “duels” between qualitatively different images (32)
• a montage of opposition (following dialectical logic), not a “parallel montage” like Griffith (34)
Chapter 4 The movement-image

**plane of immanence**: “This infinite set of all images constitutes a plane of immanence” (58-59)

- i.e. two points: (1) the image is itself real/material and not a substitute for something else, and (2) there is a plane wherein all these many real images live and intermix/interconnect.
- **“The movement-image and flowing-matter are strictly the same thing” (59).**
- “The plane of immanence is...” (59)

three types (or “avatars”) of the movement-image

1. **perception-image**
   - cinema as (non-subjective) pure perception. from a “unicentered subjective perception” or a “center of indetermination” (64)
   - about elimination, selection, or framing
   - the simple registration of the fact of the perceivability of things
   - perception is the master of space (65)
   - “perception relates movement to 'bodies' (nouns), that is to rigid objects which will serve as moving bodies or as things moved” (65)
   - corresponds to the long shot (70)

2. **action-image**
   - **“no longer elimination, selection or framing [i.e. perception], but the incurving [incurvation] of the universe, which simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things” (65)**
     - the “curving” of the universe toward someone who can “act”
   - (if perception is the master of space) action is the master of time (65)
   - “action relates movement to 'acts' (verbs) which will be the design for an assumed end or result” (65)
   - corresponds to the medium shot (70)

3. **affection-image**
   - “occupies the interval” between perceptive and active. “It surges in the centre of indetermination...between a perception which is troubling...and a hesitant action” (65)
   - “Bergon's wonderful definition of affection as 'a kind of motor tendency on a sensible nerve’” (66)
   - the way in which a subject perceives *itself*.
   - corresponds to the close-up (70)
Chapter 5 The perception-image

Q: is perception subjective or objective? (71)
A: it's often understood as both, or rather as an oscillation between these two poles.

But instead a hypothesis: what if perception is semi-subjective with “no equivalent in natural perception” (72)

- in other words, the camera is not merely objective, and hence is not indirect discourse.
- Pasolini: no, the cinema is more like free indirect discourse.

Recall the three kinds of discursive speech...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>direct discourse</th>
<th>I would rather...</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indirect discourse</td>
<td>He said he would rather...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free indirect discourse</td>
<td>He said He would rather...</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Q: why free indirect discourse?
A: “there is not a simple combination of two fully-constituted subjects of enunciation, one of which would be reporter, the other reported” (73)
A: no longer metaphor (73)

- hence a “dividing-in-two” (73), creating a secondary abstract cogito/observer.
- ** and the imposition of another vision, the free indirect subjective vision of the camera itself. (74)**
  - this is a “camera consciousness” (74) or a “self-consciousness” of the cinema (75)
WEEK 2--MOVEMENT-IMAGE AS AFFECTION, IMPULSE AND ACTION; 
COLLAPSE OF THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE

Abridged Version -- Read chapters 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12, skipping the end of Chapter 7 (pp. 111-122), and the end of Chapter 9 (pp. 155-159).

Watch the following films:
- *The Great Dictator* (d. Chaplin, 1940).

Chapter 6 The affection-image

Peirce on firstness and secondness (98)
- **secondness** -- definition through *duality* -- as action/reaction, individual/milieu, i.e. always defined within the alternation of a coupling of second and first.
- * hence the realm of the action-image (which is also a “realism” [123]) *
- **firstness** -- definition through some *uniqueness* -- “what is new in experience, what is fresh, fleeting and nevertheless eternal” (98)
- this is affection-image (which is also an “idealism” [123])
- Possible/potential: “Firstness is thus the category of the Possible. ...it is potentially considered for itself as expressed” (98).

the **clock**: both a reflecting and reflected unity (87)
- clock hands -- micro movements; motor tendency; intensive series (i.e. they move into and out of moments of punctuated singularity [i.e. it's 12 o'clock now])
- clock face -- sensitive nerve; receptive immobile surface

these are the two poles of the affection-image/close-up; they are also Eisenstein and Griffiths (90-91):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Griffith</th>
<th>Eisenstein</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reflexive face</td>
<td>intensive face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensitive nerve</td>
<td>motor tendency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonder/Quality</td>
<td>Desire/Power [Puissance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the Entity

- note: the entity is not a partial object (in the tradition of both psychoanalysis [castration] and linguistics [synecdoche, part for whole]) (95)
- **“The affect is the entity, that is Power or Quality. It is something expressed: the affect does not exist independently of something which expresses it, although it is completely distinct from it” (97).**

the close-up suspends individuation (100)

- the generic
- hence the example of *Persona*
- see also Dividual on 92

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**Chapter 7 The affection-image (continued): Power-Quality; any-space-whatever**

power-qualities (or affects) have two states (102-103)

1. the particular/individuated/real state of things
   - leads to the action-image and the medium shot
2. the virtual singularity outside of space and time
   - leads to the affection-image or the close-up: “It is the face...which gathers and expresses the affect as a complex entity, and secures the virtual conjunctions between singular points of this entity” (103)


**any-space-whatever** (109)

- an anonymous space.. “no longer a particular determined space” (109)
- “a space which is defined by parts whose linking up and orientation are not determined in advance, and can be done in an infinite number of ways” (120).
- **“a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity...a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible” (109).**
- i.e. this is a firstness or power-quality of space (just as the previous chapter is about a firstness/power-quality of the face). (110)

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**Chapter 9. The Large Form of the Action-image (i.e. heroic action)**

- S-A, from situation to action
  - “secondness”: definition through duality; polarity; everything is a *duel*.  
  - “It is this model which produced the universal triumph of the American cinema” (141)
the “hourglass” structure of SAS

S -- situation/milieu/the Ambience/the Encompasser \(141\)/synsign \(142\)

A -- Action/binomial/duel \(142\)

- “There is a binomial as soon as the state of a force relates back to an antagonistic force...the moment of the duel” \(142\)

seen across five different genres: Documentary; Psycho-social film; Film noir; Western; The Historical film.

the laws

1. S (or SS') \(151\)
   - the presence of the synsign/situation/milieu itself.
   - “in Ford's skies...the whole incurves itself around the group, the character or the home, constituting an encompasser” \(151\)

2. S → A \(152\)
   - “from the synsign to the binomial” \(152\). i.e. the duel.

3. A \(153\)
   - this is \(A\) for itself. the drama of the pure confrontation. ex: Charlie and the lion in a single shot.

4. AAA... \(153\)
   - the “whole dovetailing of duels” -- i.e. there will always be multiple duels.

5. Actualization of SA \(154\)
   - it takes a long time to actualize the action, i.e. why movies are 90 minutes long!

Chapter 10. The Small Form of the Action-image (i.e. comedic action)

- A-S, from action to situation
  - “This time it is the action which discloses the situation... The action advances blindly and the situation is disclosed in darkness, or in ambiguity” \(160\).
  - local (not global), elliptical (not spiral), constructed in events (not structural)

two poles of the index

1. elliptical gap/lack -- the \textit{absence} of the situation
2. elliptical equivocity -- the \textit{ambiguity} of the situation

Howard Hawks and the western \(164\)

Chaplin and Keaton \(169-177\)

- \textit{burlesque}
  - ** it best displays the index: “the law of the index -- the slight difference in the action which brings out an infinite distance between two situations” \(170\)
** I.e. comedy provokes endless circuits of “evanescent difference” (171).

• (Keaton: the trajectory gag and the machine gag [174-177])

Summary...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Form, SAS’</th>
<th>Small Form, ASA’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>milieu/Encompasser (141)</td>
<td>ellipse (160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psycho-social film</td>
<td>comedy of manners (costume film)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime (“actions which are duels” [164])</td>
<td>detective (“from blind actions...to obscure situations” [164])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 12. Crisis of the action-image

Thirdness

• the intermediary; relation (197)
• **mental image** (198)/relation-image (204)

**Hitchcock**: “Hitchcock [and Marx Bros!] introduces the mental image into the cinema. That is, he makes relation itself the object of an image” (203). a new kind of figure, a “figure of thought”
• weaving; a “fabric of relations” (200)
• “natural” relation, i.e. relation in the world
  • mark -- in an ordinary series, classificatory (i.e. “this bird is like all the other birds”)
  • demark -- in contradiction with the series (i.e. “that's not how windmills turn!”)
  • similar to/overlaps with the symbol (204)
• Q? “Hitchcock brings the cinema to completion” (204)

Crisis -- WW2; end of “American Dream”.. etc (206); 1948, 1958, 1968 (211)

1. the dispersive situation -- no longer “globalizing or synthetic” (207)
2. the deliberately weak links -- “reality is lacunary”; chance (207)
3. the voyage form; the return journey (208)
4. the consciousness of clichés
5. conspiracy/plot: the “condemnation of the plot [complot]” -- “one single misery.. a great and powerful plot” (209)

**Italian Neo-realism** -- this is what first forged the five characteristics of the crisis (211)

**French New Wave** -- the making-false of the image (213-214)