

Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* [1983], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

WEEK 1--INTRODUCTION TO THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE;  
MOVEMENT-IMAGE AS PERCEPTION

**Abridged Version** -- Read chapters 1-5, skipping part of Chapter 3 (pp. 40-55), the end of Chapter 4 (pp. 66-70), and part of Chapter 5 (pp. 76-80).

Watch the following films:

- *Broken Blossoms* (d. Griffith, 1919).
- *October: Ten Days That Shook the World* (d. Eisenstein, 1927).
- *Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans* (d. Murnau, 1927).
- *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (d. Dreyer, 1928).
- *Metropolis* (d. Lang, 1927).
- *Man with a Movie Camera* (d. Vertov, 1929).

## 1 Bergson and movement

<i>movement</i>	<i>space covered</i>
indivisible	divisible
“heterogenous, irreducible” (1)	“single, identical, homogenous space” (1)
concrete/qualitative duration [ <i>durée</i> ]	subdivided/quantitative time
privileged instants -- “keyframes” or special tableaux	any-instant-whatevers -- impartial quantizing

Hence Bergson's conclusion that cinema is **false movement**

- the cinematographic illusion
- *immobile sections + abstract time*  
i.e. reconstitute movement by adding a “mechanical, homogenous, universal” time axis (ex 24 fps) to a series of photographic still frames.
- this is “false” because it's an *illusion* of movement.

Yet Deleuze wants to show that the cinema can *also* be a **real movement**

“Can we conclude that the result is artificial because the means are artificial?” (2)

- phenomenological? experiential?
- *real movement -> concrete duration*  
“In short, cinema...” (2)

## 2 privileged instants and any-instant-whatevers [*instant quelconque*]

- ancient: “formal transcendental elements (poses),” privileged instants, dance, an “intelligible synthesis” (4)
- modern: “immanent material elements (sections),” any-instant-whatevers, cinema, a “sensible analysis” (4)

definition of cinema (5)

(yet the privileged instant can also return in the cinema, hence any-instant-whatevers can also do double duty as privileged instants [6])

### 3 change

- \*\* instants A and B are to movement, as movements A and B are to duration \*\*
- thus cinema itself is a Whole [*le Tout*] (8) and movement implies the change in the Whole
- the whole is “the Open” [*l’Ouvert*]; it “endures” (9)
- difference between a whole and a set [*ensemble*] (10)
- hence three levels (11)
  1. *sets of discernible parts* (frames)
    - i.e. **any-instant-whatevers**
  2. the *real movement of translation* between frames
    - i.e. **movement-images**
  3. the *duration* or the *whole*, a “spiritual reality”
    - i.e. **time-images** (11), also called here “duration-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are beyond movement itself”

## Chapter 2 Frame and shot, framing and cutting [*cadre et plan, cadrage et découpage*]

### framing

- corresponds to Bergson's *first* level: *sets of discernible parts* (frames)
- five points (12-18; summary on 18):
  - (1) framing is determination of a set (and hence tends toward either rarefaction or saturation);
  - (2) in that determination it is also an *absolute geometric* delimiting of space, i.e. a rectangle or an iris;
  - (3) but also a *relative* geometric force, *internal* to the frame, i.e. composition and pattern, zones w/in the image, a *deterritorialization* of the elements of the set (15);
  - (4) an angle of framing or point-of-view;
  - (5) out-of-field/offscreen space [*hors-champ*] as both diegetic space and “a more radical Elsewhere [*Ailleurs*]” (17).

### **the shot** (18)

- corresponds to Bergson's *second* level: the *real movement of translation* between frames (hence the movement-image in its purest sense)
- bounded and determined by cutting
- determines the movement of the closed system (of the framing of the shot)
  - such movement *always* happens in two ways at once:
    1. the micro movement of all the elements inside the shot.
    2. the macro movement of the whole (irreducible to the micro elements).
- he calls the shot an intermediary between framing and montage -- it gets pulled in both directions (19-20)
- thus “the shot *is* the movement-image” (22, emphasis added)

**montage** -- i.e. cinema only becomes cinema when you *move the camera*, either via a mobile camera (continuous movement) or via montage (discontinuous movement) (24-25)

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### **Chapter 3 Montage**

- corresponds to Bergson's *third* level: the composition of movement images into a *duration* or *whole* (hence a gesture toward the time-image)
  - \*\* “Montage is the operation which bears on the movement-images to release the whole from them, that is, the image *of* time” (29) \*\*
  - he says this is “indirect,” the composition of “an indirect image of time” (30)

#### 1 the *organic* American school (Griffith)

- montage is like an organism that has many parts that are different but work together (shot, reverse-shot, insert, etc.) (30)
- “parallel alternate montage” (30) -- i.e. a rhythmic alternation between parallel events.

#### 2 the *dialectic* Soviet school (Eisenstein)

- i.e. not organic interplay of different elements (shot, reverse-shot, insert), but more profound “duels” between qualitatively different images (32)
- a *montage of opposition* (following dialectical logic), not a “parallel montage” like Griffith (34)

## Chapter 4 The movement-image

**plane of immanence:** “This infinite set of all images constitutes a plane of immanence” (58-59) --

- i.e. two points: (1) the image is itself real/material and not a substitute for something else, and (2) there is a plane wherein all these many real images live and intermix/interconnect.
- \*\* “The *movement-image* and *flowing-matter* are strictly the same thing” (59).\*\*
- “The plane of immanence is...” (59)

three types (or “avatars”) of the movement-image

### 1. perception-image

- cinema as (non-subjective) pure perception. from a “unicentered subjective perception” or a “center of indetermination” (64)
- about elimination, selection, or framing
- the simple registration of the fact of the perceivability of things
- perception is the *master of space* (65)
- “perception relates movement to 'bodies' (nouns), that is to rigid objects which will serve as moving bodies or as things moved” (65)
- corresponds to the long shot (70)

### 2. action-image

- \*\* “no longer elimination, selection or framing [i.e. perception], but the incurving [*incurvation*] of the universe, which simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things” (65) \*\*
  - the “curving” of the universe toward someone who can “act”
- (if perception is the master of space) action is the *master of time* (65)
- “action relates movement to 'acts' (verbs) which will be the design for an assumed end or result” (65)
- corresponds to the medium shot (70)

### 3. affection-image

- “occupies the interval” between perceptive and active. “It surges in the centre of indetermination...between a perception which is troubling...and a hesitant action” (65)
- “Bergson's wonderful definition of affection as 'a kind of motor tendency on a sensible nerve’” (66)
- the way in which a subject perceives *itself*.
- corresponds to the close-up (70)

## Chapter 5 The perception-image

Q: is perception subjective or objective? (71)

A: it's often understood as both, or rather as an oscillation between these two poles.

But instead a hypothesis: what if perception is *semi-subjective* with “no equivalent in natural perception” (72)

- in other words, the camera is not merely objective, and hence is **not indirect discourse**.
- Pasolini: no, the cinema is more like *free indirect discourse*.

Recall the three kinds of discursive speech...

<i>direct discourse</i>	I would rather...
<i>indirect discourse</i>	He said he would rather...
<i>free indirect discourse</i>	<del>He said</del> He would rather...

Q: why *free indirect discourse*?

A: “there is not a simple combination of two fully-constituted subjects of enunciation, one of which would be reporter, the other reported” (73)

A: no longer metaphor (73)

- hence a “dividing-in-two” (73), creating a secondary abstract cogito/observer.
- \*\* and the imposition of another vision, the **free indirect subjective** vision of the camera itself. (74) \*\*
  - this is a “camera consciousness” (74) or a “self-consciousness” of the cinema (75)

**WEEK 2--MOVEMENT-IMAGE AS AFFECTION, IMPULSE AND ACTION;  
COLLAPSE OF THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE**

**Abridged Version** -- Read chapters 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12, skipping the end of Chapter 7 (pp. 111-122), and the end of Chapter 9 (pp. 155-159).

Watch the following films:

- *A Man Escaped* (d. Bresson, 1956).
- *The Scarlet Empress* (d. Sternberg, 1934).
- *The Great Dictator* (d. Chaplin, 1940).
- *Rio Bravo* (d. Hawks, 1959).
- *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance* (d. Ford, 1962).

### Chapter 6 The affection-image

Peirce on firstness and secondness (98)

- **secondness** -- definition through *duality* -- as action/reaction, individual/milieu, i.e. always defined within the alternation of a coupling of second and first.
  - \* hence the realm of the action-image (which is also a “realism” [123]) \*
- **firstness** -- definition through *some uniqueness* -- “what is new in experience, what is fresh, fleeting and nevertheless eternal” (98)
  - this is affection-image (which is also an “idealism” [123])
  - Possible/potential: “Firstness is thus the category of the Possible. ...it is potentially considered for itself as expressed” (98).

the **clock**: both a reflecting and reflected unity (87)

- clock hands -- micro movements; motor tendency; intensive series (i.e. they move into and out of moments of punctuated singularity [i.e. it's 12 o'clock *now*])
- clock face -- sensitive nerve; receptive immobile surface

these are the two poles of the affection-image/close-up; they are also Eisenstein and Griffiths (90-91):

<i>Griffith</i>	<i>Eisenstein</i>
reflexive face	intensive face
sensitive nerve	motor tendency
Wonder/Quality	Desire/Power [ <i>Puissance</i> ]

the Entity

- note: the entity is *not* a partial object (in the tradition of both psychoanalysis [castration] and linguistics [synecdoche, part for whole]) (95)
- \*\* “The affect is the entity, that is Power or Quality. It is something expressed: the affect does not exist independently of something which expresses it, although it is completely distinct from it” (97). \*\*

the close-up suspends individuation (100)

- the generic
- hence the example of *Persona*
- see also Dividual on 92

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## Chapter 7 The affection-image (continued): Power-Quality; any-space-whatever

power-qualities (or affects) have two states (102-103)

1. the particular/individuated/real state of things
  - leads to the action-image and the medium shot
2. the virtual singularity outside of space and time
  - leads to the affection-image or the close-up: “It is the face...which gathers and expresses the affect as a complex entity, and secures the virtual conjunctions between singular points of this entity” (103)

Dreyer, *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928) (106).

**any-space-whatever** (109)

- an anonymous space.. “no longer a particular determined space” (109)
  - “a space which is defined by parts whose linking up and orientation are not determined in advance, and can be done in an infinite number of ways” (120).
- \*\*“a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity...a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible” (109). \*\*
- i.e. this is a firstness or power-quality of space (just as the previous chapter is about a firstness/power-quality of the face). (110)

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## Chapter 9. The Large Form of the Action-image (i.e. heroic action)

- S-A, from situation to action
  - “secondness”: definition through duality; polarity; everything is a *duel*.
- “It is this model which produced the universal triumph of the American cinema” (141)

the “hourglass” structure of SAS'

**S -- situation/milieu/the Ambience/the Encompasser (141)/synsign (142)**

**A -- Action/binomial/duel (142)**

- “There is a binomial as soon as the state of a force relates back to an antagonistic force...the moment of the duel” (142)

seen across five different genres: Documentary; Psycho-social film; Film noir; Western; The Historical film.

the laws

1. S (or SS') (151)
  - the presence of the synsign/situation/milieu itself.
  - “in Ford's skies...the whole incurves itself around the group, the character or the home, constituting an encompasser” (151)
2. S → A (152)
  - “from the synsign to the binomial” (152).. i.e. the duel.
3. A (153)
  - this is *A for itself*. the drama of the pure confrontation. ex: Charlie and the lion in a single shot.
4. AAA... (153)
  - the “whole dovetailing of duels” -- i.e. there will always be multiple duels.
5. Actualization of SA (154)
  - it takes a long time to actualize the action, i.e. why movies are 90 minutes long!

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### **Chapter 10. The Small Form of the Action-image (i.e. comedic action)**

- A-S, from action to situation
  - “This time it is the action which discloses the situation... The action advances blindly and the situation is disclosed in darkness, or in ambiguity” (160).
  - local (not global), elliptical (not spiral), constructed in events (not structural)

two poles of the index

1. elliptical gap/lack -- the *absence* of the situation
2. elliptical equivocity -- the *ambiguity* of the situation

Howard Hawks and the western (164)

Chaplin and Keaton (169-177)

- burlesque
  - \*\* it best displays the index: “the law of the index -- the slight difference in the action which brings out an infinite distance between two situations” (170).



- \*\* I.e. comedy provokes endless circuits of “evanescent difference” (171).
- (Keaton: the trajectory gag and the machine gag [174-177])

*Summary...*

<i>Large Form, SAS'</i>	<i>Small Form, ASA'</i>
milieu/Encompasser (141)	ellipse (160)
psycho-social film	comedy of manners (costume film)
crime (“actions which are duels” [164])	detective (“from blind actions...to obscure situations” [164])

## Chapter 12. Crisis of the action-image

### Thirdness

- the intermediary; relation (197)
- **mental image** (198)/**relation-image** (204)  
**Hitchcock:** “Hitchcock [and Marx Bros!] introduces the mental image into the cinema. That is, he makes relation itself the object of an image” (203). a new kind of figure, a “figure of thought”
  - weaving; a “fabric of relations” (200)
  - “natural” relation, i.e. relation *in the world*
    - mark -- in an ordinary series, classificatory (i.e. “this bird is like all the other birds”)
    - demark -- in contradiction with the series (i.e. “that's not how windmills turn!”)
      - similar to/overlaps with the symbol (204)
  - Q? “Hitchcock brings the cinema to completion” (204)

**Crisis** -- WW2; end of “American Dream”.. etc (206); 1948, 1958, 1968 (211)

1. the dispersive situation -- no longer “globalizing or synthetic” (207)
2. the deliberately weak links -- “reality is lacunary”; chance (207)
3. the voyage form; the return journey (208)
4. the consciousness of clichés
5. conspiracy/plot: the “condemnation of the plot [*complot*]” -- “one single misery.. a great and powerful plot” (209)

**Italian Neo-realism** -- this is what first forged the five characteristics of the crisis (211)

**French New Wave** -- the making-false of the image (213-214)